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ABSTRACT 
 
Why do officials in some countries favor entrenched contractors while others assign public con-
tracts more impartially? According to the research, such variation responds to differences in politi-
cal institutions, economic development and historical preconditions. This paper instead emphasizes 
the interplay between politics and bureaucracy. It suggests that corruption risks are minimized 
when the two groups involved in decision-making on public contracts—politicians and bureau-
crats—have known different interests. This is institutionalized when politicians are accountable to 
the electorate, while bureaucrats are accountable to their peers, and not to politicians.  We test this 
hypothesis with a novel experience-based measure of career incentives in the public sector— utiliz-
ing a survey with over 85,000 individuals in 212 European regions—and a new objective corrup-
tion-risk measure including over 1.4 million procurement contracts. Both show a remarkable sub-
national variation across Europe. The study finds corruption risks significantly lower where bureau-
crats’ careers do not depend on political connections.  
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Introduction 
Prosperous societies require well-functioning institutions. Today, most scholars agree that wealth, 
health and happiness are highly dependent on institutional quality generally, and on the absence of 
corruption more specifically (see for example Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009; Mauro 
1995; Veenhoven 2010). Analyzing causes of corruption has consequently attracted considerable 
attention from scholars of comparative politics, economics, law and history, and research has made 
substantial progress during the last two decades (for influential studies see for example Keefer 
2007; La Porta et al. 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Rothstein 2011; Treisman 2007). An im-
portant insight is that the interests of elite groups and the public do for the most of the time not 
convey. Unconstrained elites have incentives to take advantage of their positions and enrich them-
selves and their clique at the expense of general welfare; contemporary and historical examples of 
this are overwhelming (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2011; North, Wallis and 
Weingast 2009). Those who have the greatest chances for corruption, and whose action might have 
the most far-reaching consequences, in scale as well as role models, are thus in a constant “moral 
hazard” (Miller 2000, 289). However, the large variations in corruption levels and welfare provision 
worldwide suggest that such moral hazards can be handled under the right circumstances. This 
paper tries to specify those circumstances and to investigate a central implication of the hypothesis. 
Our proposal starts from the premise that, when groups with known different interests are forced 
to work together, they monitor each other, which pushes both groups away from self-interest to-
wards the common good. Abuse of power will be more common if everyone in the elite has the 
same interest, because no one will stand in the way of self-interested behavior, while abuses of 
power will be less common if groups with different interests are represented in the elite, because 
everyone must adjust their behavior so that it can hold up to public scrutiny. There is of course a 
real increased risk for whistleblowing in elites with divided interests, but it is probably even more 
important that everyone anticipates that risk, and adjusts their behavior accordingly. Mainly follow-
ing Gary Miller (2000; with Hammond 1994; with Falaschetti 2001; with Knott 2008), this paper 
suggests that, if incentivized in different ways, politicians and bureaucrats are two significant elite 
groups with known different interests. Researchers in the field of public administration have long 
been aware of the importance of recruitment regimes and career perspectives for bureaucrats 
(Goodknow 1900; Weber 1978 [1922]): Wilson 1887). We think that whether bureaucrats are di-
rectly dependent on politicians for their careers is a useful approximation for the separation of in-
terests between bureaucrats and politicians.   
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This paper makes use of the sub-national variation within Europe, where there is an often ignored 
variation in corruption, prosperity and health, as well as in cultural and institutional factors (Char-
ron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014). This provides an excellent opportunity for testing comparative 
theories on new data. We compare 212 European regions using two unique datasets. On the inde-
pendent side, measuring the career incentives in the public sector, we use a new experienced-based 
measure, including over 85,000 individuals, while we take advantage of a novel objective corruption 
risk measure on the dependent side, based on over 1.4 million public procurement contract awards. 
The main results of our analysis corroborate the theory and demonstrate that high-level corruption 
risks are indeed lower when politicians and bureaucrats are incentivized in different ways, even 
when cultural, economic and political controls are included. 
The paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, most studies have focused on 
political institutions, or on economic and cultural factors, but have left bureaucracy outside of the 
story. While much has been learned about the political constraints needed for good governance, 
and the economic and cultural conditions often correlated with it, not assigning the bureaucracy 
any agency in its own right is not only a misrepresentation of reality but comes with an obvious risk 
of biased results. Second, those studies that have analyzed bureaucratic institutions have, due to 
data limitations, mainly worked with aggregated data on the national level, often with perception-
based measures on both the independent and dependent sides (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 
2012; Rauch and Evans 2000). The perception-based measures have certainly been important for 
developing the knowledge in this field but have also suffered a great deal of criticism (Andersson 
and Heywood 2009; Kurtz and Schrank 2007). There is a pressing demand for the more experi-
ence-based and objective measures of good governance and corruption, which this study provides. 
Third, prevailing theories of institutional effects are often developed with a handful of countries in 
mind, and tested on more or less the same set of countries, which violates basic advice in compara-
tive social science design (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Our focus on a central part of bureau-
cratic institutions, namely career perspectives, and a research strategy that explores sub-national 
variations overcome all these problems. 
The paper’s next section defines central concepts and explains our suggestion in more detail. This is 
followed by a section on the research strategy, which describes the design, presents the two new 
datasets and discusses methodological issues. The next section describes the most prevailing alter-
native explanations and how they are taken into account. The results section follows, reporting our 
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empirical findings, alternative specifications and robustness checks. The final section concludes the 
paper.  
 
How careers can affect corruption  
Corruption is often defined as the abuse of public power for private gain. This paper investigates 
grand corruption and, more specifically, the extent to which public positions are used to benefit 
particular business interests (Rose-Ackerman 1999, chap. 3). Before going into the details of the 
investigation, we should remind ourselves that corruption is not an exception but rather the norm 
throughout history (North Wallis, and Weingast 2009). As already mentioned, provision of public 
goods inherently implies opportunities for abuse (Miller 2000; Miller and Knott 2008). Rulers can 
always take advantage of their positions at the expense of social welfare. If other elected officials, 
such as legislators, tie the hands of the executive, opportunities for rent-seeking simply move from 
one office to another (Miller and Hammond 1994). One precondition for this paper is therefore 
that there is no incentive system that credibly eliminates all possibility for abuse (Miller 2000). We 
can only hope to limit the problems. 
All groups of individuals with decision-making abilities, elected officials as well as bureaucrats, are 
thus susceptible to taking advantage of the opportunities for private gain that all public policies 
entail. Homogenous elite groups are bound to form what Madison referred to as factions – “a 
number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, 
or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (Federalist # 10, 56) – and our 
simple point is that such factions are much harder to shape when elites are heterogeneous. 
Fukuyama (2011) indicates that factions that have advanced the interests of their members and 
their families, at the expense of national interests, have preceded the fall of empires. All polities 
face the threat of potential factions that can take over the reins of power and parasitically use it to 
their own advantage. And, as this risk is always present, it is difficult to fight. If party machines 
presiding over a spoils system are fought via the introduction of powerful bureaucracies, for exam-
ple, this might create powerful bureaucratic factions as a by-product. Consider the virtual monopo-
ly of the whole policy cycle—from enacting laws in the legislature to implementing them—
exercised by civil servants who occupy both administrative and political posts in countries belong-
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ing to the Napoleonic tradition (Parrado 2000). In other words, again following Miller (2000), one 
must consider the opportunities for rent-seeking to be universal in the public realm and, following 
Madison and Fukuyama (2011), one must consider the motivations for rent-seeking to be universal 
and not restricted only to political officials. We thus need to be pessimistic about the nature of all 
officials, both those who are elected and those who are not, such as highly competent trained civil 
servants. 
Given these assumptions, we argue that a way to minimize corruption opportunities is to introduce 
mechanisms that systematically break down the creation of factions. One powerful mechanism is 
reflected in the debate on how relations between politicians and bureaucrats should be organized 
that started more than a century ago and has continued into the modern age, with contributions 
from scholars such as Heclo (1977), Moe (1989), Miller (2000), Rauch and Evans (2000), Hood and 
Lodge (2006), Lewis (2008), Rouban (2012) and others. Top officials need to be prevented from 
building a stable faction, and this can be achieved by separating the career prospects of two types of 
officials that occupy those positions, that is, politicians and bureaucrats. If the career prospects of 
politicians and bureaucrats do not depend on each other, they will be less likely to form welfare-
diminishing factions. This is in turn possible to achieve if they respond to the political party and 
their peers, respectively, which in many developed countries are the defining features of the two 
groups (Alesina and Tabellini 2007). If the future prospects for bureaucrats depend on their profes-
sional status and not on following the instructions of politicians, the chances increase for bureau-
crats to expose corrupt acts taken by politicians, and vice versa. In other words, when the career 
prospects of politicians and bureaucrats are clearly separated, there are thus embedded two-way 
monitoring mechanisms where politicians watch bureaucrats and bureaucrats watch politicians. If, 
on the contrary, careers are integrated, so that bureaucrats careers are determined by political con-
nections, for example, they will be more willing to form colluding factions with politicians (Dahl-
ström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012).   
For instance, granting public contracts to entrenched interests, rather than to the best bidder, re-
quires a faction. This is illustrated by a case called Operación Punica, unleashed by the Spanish judicial 
authorities in October 2014 (El País 2014a). Over 50 people were involved in a complex chain of 
events starting from public contractors offering bribes to brokers with political connections, via 
elected officials, to bureaucrats writing the public tendering, and then back to politicians, who, in 
turn, were paid in Swiss bank accounts by ghost companies. In Operación Punica, politicians did not 
investigate subordinates’ behavior, even though they later admitted that this behavior was suspi-
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cious, which illustrates that a politician who discovers that a bureaucrat has been taking advantage 
of her position will have fewer incentives to report the malfeasances if she is a fellow party mem-
ber. The President of the Madrid region acknowledged that “I should have thought something 
strange was going on” (PeriodistaDigital 2014), after witnessing how his subordinate’s car, which 
belonged to a businessman, was intentionally burned in what reminded the Madrid President of the 
“horse head scene in The Godfather” (EuropaPress 2014). Yet the Madrid President did not reveal 
anything until her subordinate had actually been formally accused and imprisoned in 2014.  
Or take Operación Gurtel, where €449m of public money was lost in a series of corrupt public pro-
curement contracts and the prosecuting judge indicted 40 politicians, political appointees and en-
trepreneurs (El País, 2015). When the career prospects of bureaucrats are linked to politicians, bu-
reaucrats will turn a blind eye or even directly engage in the corruption activities instead of speaking 
up. This is exactly what happened in Operación Gurtel, where bureaucrats of the Madrid regional 
government paid bills to contractors even if they found the bills suspicious (El País 2013a).   
There is also historical evidence suggesting that dismantling the connection between politicians’ and 
bureaucrats’ careers in Britain and the U.S. in the second half of the 19th century hampered corrup-
tion. It was common knowledge then that access to the British administration via connections con-
tributed to corruption, exposed especially between 1810 and 1835. Officials who owed their posi-
tion to political connections enriched themselves at the expense of social welfare (Rubinstein 1983). 
Against this, the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report issued that recruitment to the British civil ser-
vice should be according to open and competitive examinations (Harling 1996, Greenaway 2004). 
British civil servants and politicians reached a “public service bargain” according to which politi-
cians renounced appointing civil servants and the latter renounced making political careers (Hood 
and Lodge 2006). This bargain is largely absent in most administrations in Southern Europe, where 
politicians appoint loyalists to administrative positions and civil servants become politicians 
(Sotiropoulos 2004).  
In the U.S., there was, a coalition of good government reformers who, tired of widespread corrup-
tion, advocated a separation of politics from administration (Hoogenboom 1961, Knott and Miller 
1987). Contemporary observers, such as William Clarke, noted the connection between the ability 
of politicians to appoint officials at will and levels of corruption: “…as official patronage, either 
direct or indirect, is a great if not perhaps the chief cause of corrupt elections, it logically follows 
that the less patronage there is, the less corruption there will be” (quoted in Frant 1993, 994). The 
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connection between politically appointed officials and corruption was so clear in fact that, after the 
Civil War, it “…replaced the slave owner as the jinni of evil” (Schultz and Maranto 1998, 55). This 
strengthened the reformists grouped around the National Civil Service Reform League (Schultz and 
Maranto 1998). As a result, numerous administrations introduced civil service commissions or oth-
er mechanisms to separate the political and administrative spheres such as the council manager type 
of local government.  
Returning to Spain, we offer a final illustration of how the relationship between the separation of 
the careers of politicians and bureaucrats and corruption might look. There are notable regional 
variations in both factors. In particular, one can see how a lack of incentives helps to cover up col-
lusive behavior between private firms and politicians in some regions, including Madrid and Cata-
lonia, while not in others, such as the Basque country. 
It is documented that a large number of politicians received bribes from construction groups, pri-
vate contractors and all sorts of businesses so regularly that it became a “tradition” (Financial Times, 
2013a). Indeed, the treasurer of the conservative party, who had accumulated €38m in Swiss bank 
accounts (El País 2013b), acknowledged that he had been responsible for a scheme of illegal fund-
ing of his party from powerful business entrepreneurs in the country.  
Thanks to exhaustive judicial investigations, we know how corruption exchanges usually took place. 
Businessmen offered a sum—generally around 3 percent of the public tender—to politicians who, 
in turn, persuaded civil servants to bend the rules of the public tender offering so as to benefit a 
certain bidder (El País 2014). These practices have been common in several Spanish regions, such 
as Valencia, Murcia, Madrid and León (The Guardian 2014), as well as in Catalonia, where the for-
mer president, Jordi Pujol, and large parts of his family are under investigation for hiding money in 
Switzerland (The Economist 2014). 
Judicial investigations have uncovered that the favorable treatment to contractors who had paid a 
bribe was possible thanks to the political control of the administration by the ruling party. Bureau-
crats testifying in court admitted they were told “…which public contractors must win…” and, if 
they complained, they were “threatened” with dismissal. On one occasion, they were extremely 
anxious because the materials used by the private contractor to build a stage for a public event were 
of such “poor quality” that they feared that a catastrophe could occur; yet the fear of losing their 
job was so strong that they reported neither to the media nor to judicial authorities (Cadena SER 
2014).  
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But there are exceptions within Spain, such as the above-mentioned Basque country, which ranks 
as the least corrupt region in the country (Charron, Lapuente and Dijkstra 2014). The Basque coun-
try also tops Transparency International’s ranking of 17 Spanish regions in terms of transparency, 
both in general and concerning information on public contracting. Politicians also view corruption 
as a relatively minor phenomenon in the region (Diario.es 2014). For example, the MP José Antonio 
Rubalkaba compares the Basque country with other corruption-ridden regions in Spain, and says:  
“…political corruption does not exist as such in the Basque country, but only very individual cases 
of misappropriation” (El Pais 2008). Analysts tend to agree that, despite the Basque country having 
its own problems, there is not the “3 percent” problem that prevails in most other Spanish regions 
(Emilio Alfaro, El Pais 2008). 
To gain an understanding of why the strong links between vested business and politicians are less 
prevalent in the Basque country than in other regions of Spain, such as Catalonia or Madrid, ex-
perts emphasize the importance of the specific organization of the Basque public administration. 
Unlike other regions, the Basque country has a highly prestigious Instituto Vasco de Adminstración 
Pública (IVAP), which is a government institution that was created in 1983 and is responsible for 
the recruitment and formation of Basque civil servants (Hernández 2010). The IVAP overviews the 
process of selection of senior civil servants who, unlike their peers in other Spanish regions, are not 
appointed at will by their political superiors. The result is a widely held understanding that careers 
in the Basque administration are based on transparent, fair and meritocratic criteria, and not on 
connections (Hernández 2010).1 
 
Research Design, Data and Method 
The main purpose of the empirical part is to investigate whether our hypothesis, that different ca-
reer incentives for politicians and bureaucrats hamper corruption, is reflected in the data. To the 
present, most analyses of corruption causes have been national comparisons and scholars are often 
                                                     
1
 We would like to thank Rafael Jiménez-Asensio – former advisor of the Basque Institute of Public Administration – 
Carles Ramiò – former director of the Catalan School of Public Administration – and Ines Pérez de Chávarri – corre-
spondent in the Basque country of Spain’s leading newspaper El País – for helpful comments regarding the structure of 
the Basque administration and grand corruption in the Basque country.  
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forced to work with perception-based measures, such as the well-known Control of Corruption 
index from the World Bank and the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International. 
Although studies using these approaches have indeed contributed extensively to the field, they are 
limited by both design and data. Cross-national comparisons of causes of corruption have at least 
two, and sometimes three, problems in common. 
First, and perhaps most important, theories tested with cross-national comparisons almost always 
draw information initially from differences between the same countries. We are certainly not saying 
that there is something wrong with developing theories inspired by empirical observations, that is 
only natural, but, as noted by Satori (1970) and forcefully argued by King, Keohane and Verba 
(1994), making theories less restrictive after empirical observations in one dataset requires new data 
in order for the theory to be properly tested. It otherwise comes close to data fitting, which in turn 
increases the risk of omitted variable bias. If we continue comparing the same countries over and 
over again, with better matching between theory and data each time, we make this mistake collec-
tively. 
Second, there are good reasons to believe that within country differences are as important as be-
tween country differences. In Italy for example, the northern regions resemble the best performing 
German Länder in factors such as unemployment, per capita income, education and corruption, 
while the southern regions look more like the lowest performing countries in the EU. Similar large 
differences can also be found in Belgium, Spain, Romania and many other countries (Charron, 
Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2014). In a worldwide analysis explaining variation in economic develop-
ment and productivity, Gennaioli et al (2012) find that sub-national explanatory factors often trump 
national level factors. Cross-national comparisons thus miss this variability as they must trust the 
less informative country mean and thus expose themselves to what has been called the “whole-
nation-bias” (Rokkan 1970). Lipjhart (1971); later, Snyder (2001) underlined that, as comparativists 
are naturally limited by data availability, they need to increase the number of cases as much as pos-
sible, and sub-national comparison offers a particularly promising avenue for doing so. 
Third, studies that use standard indicators of corruption and good governance are also affected by 
the widely held critique of these measures for being imprecise due to their heavy dependence on 
perceptions. The standard request is to take individual experiences and objective indicators of cor-
ruption into consideration to a greater extent and move away from perceptions (Abramo 2008; 
Andersson and Heywood 2009; Kurtz and Schrank 2007). 
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This paper avoids these three problems by analyzing sub-national data, comparing 212 European 
regions, with newly collected data for both the dependent and the independent variables. Our data 
allow us to build an experience-based measure of the career incentives in the public sector on the 
independent side and a novel objective corruption risk measure, based on over 1.4 million public 
procurement contract awards, on the dependent side. The next two sections describe these two 
datasets in detail. 
However, before we discuss the datasets, we would like to address a key issue in any analysis at the 
sub-national level. In countries such as Germany, Belgium, Italy or Spain, local constituents elect 
regional governments that are to some degree autonomous in terms of forming their administration 
while, in more politically centralized countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia or Portugal, the 
regions that we target (so-called NUTS 1 and 2) are meaningful only in the sense that EU develop-
ment funds are targeted directly to them and that Eurostat reports annual data on them. It can 
therefore be argued that administrative and political responsibility varies too much. This study ar-
gues otherwise, in that we attempt to capture all regional variation within a country. This is defend-
able, we think, as scholars have noted that the provision and quality of public services controlled by 
a powerful central government can nonetheless largely vary across different regions (Tabellini 
2008). We will take this potential objection to our data into special consideration in our analysis, 
however, and re-run all models with only the politically meaningful regions in the sample.  
Corruption risks 
On the dependent side, this paper uses micro-level public procurement data to assess the risk of 
high-level corruption. This kind of data is used here in an international comparative context for the 
first time. The data contain information on individual public procurement tenders for EU28 be-
tween 2009 and 2013, including for example contract value, the deadline for submitting bids and 
the assessment criteria used. They derive from the European Union’s Tenders Electronic Daily 
(http://ted.europa.eu/), which is the mandatory online publication for every tender that falls under 
the remit of the Public Procurement Directive. This means that large contracts are typically includ-
ed in the database, with publication thresholds varying over time while being approximately 
125 000 Euro for service contracts and 4 000 000 Euro for public works contracts. The database 
contains about 2.2 million contracts awarded for the entire period; however, we used data on only 
1 403 939 contracts, excluding small countries without a sufficient number of contracts and drop-
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ping contracts below the mandatory publication threshold. As a result, 26 EU member states have 
indicators derived from public procurement micro data (EU26 henceforth).2 
The data are of varying quality, and fields are missing for some countries. In countries such as 
Germany, issuers of contracts submit tender information as scanned documents while, in others, 
such as the Czech Republic, data flow in an integrated online system. This implies country-specific 
data errors. Nevertheless, in order to enhance data quality, the European Commission, DG Markt, 
which is the ultimate source of the database, has implemented a range of data enhancement and 
cleaning procedures.  
We try to capture high-level corruption risk at the regional level. Our measures tap into deliberate 
restriction of open competition for government contracts in order to benefit a well-connected 
company (Fazekas, Tóth and King 2013), and we operationalize our dependent variable in two 
ways, differing only in the number of components included.  
First, the simplest indication of restricted competition is when only one bid was submitted in a 
tender on an otherwise competitive market. Hence, the percentage of single-bidder contracts 
awarded in all the awarded contracts is the most straightforward measure we use. 
TABLE 1, BIVARIATE PEARSON CORRELATION BETWEEN ‘OBJECTIVE’ MEASURES OF REGIONAL 
CORRUPTION AND SURVEY-BASED INDICATORS 
 
Variable Percent single bidder Regional CRI Observations 
Percent single bidder   0.69** 185 
Regional CRI 0.69**  185 
EQI (2013) -0.61** -0.54** 185 
Corruption perception 0.55** 0.47** 185 
Reported bribery 0.53** 0.59** 185 
Comment: ** significant at the 5% level 
Second, the more complex indication of high-level corruption incorporates characteristics of the 
tendering procedure that are in the hands of public officials who conduct the tender and suggests 
deliberate competition restriction. The following process-related indicators of corruption risks were 
                                                     
2
 AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, and UK. 
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thus included: i) a type of restricted, non-open tendering procedure; ii) the use of subjective, non-
price related assessment criteria; iii) a very short advertisement period; and iv) a quick evaluation of 
bids. Each of these are large and significant predictors of single-bidder contract awards when con-
trolling for the sector of the contracting entity (e.g. education, health), type of contracting entity 
(e.g. municipality, central government), year of contract award, main product market of procured 
goods and services (e.g. roads, training) and contract value. The average incidence of single bids 
received and the four processes related to ‘red flags’ constitute a composite indicator: the Corrup-
tion Risk Index (0≤CRI≤1, where 0=minimum corruption risk and 1=maximum corruption risk). 
While the validity of both outcome measures predominantly stems from their direct fit with the 
definition of high-level corruption, their association with widely used survey-based corruption indi-
cators and further objective indicators of corruption risks underpins their validity. As reported in 
Table 1, both corruption risk indicators (2009-2013 averages per NUTS region) correlate as ex-
pected with the European Quality of Government Index (EQI), which to our knowledge is the best 
regional measurement of institutional quality and corruption (Charron, Dijsktra and Lapuente 
2014), and to two sub-components of the EQI, corruption perceptions in of public sector services 
and reported public sector bribery. 
FIGURE 1, AVERAGE CORRUPTION RISKS OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SUPPLIERS REGISTERED 
ABROAD, EU26, 2009-2013, NCONTRACT=14 909 
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To further explore the validity of our measure, we also inspect two more objective micro-level risk 
indicators, namely the procurement suppliers’ country of origin and contract prices. First, it is ex-
pected that higher corruption risk contracts are won by companies registered in tax havens as their 
secrecy allows for hiding illicit money flows (Shaxson and Christensen 2014), which is shown in the 
case in Figure 1. Second, we expect corruption to drive prices up. A simplistic, albeit widely used, 
indicator of price in the absence of reliable unit prices is the ratio of actual contract value to initially 
estimated contract value (Coviello-Mariniello 2014). As expected, both the single-bidder contract 
and CRI are associated with a higher price ratio. Single-bidder contracts are associated with a 7 
percent higher contract value, while contracts with 1 CRI higher are associated with a 9 percent 
higher contract value, both reported in Table 3 below. 
TABLE 3, LINEAR REGRESSION WITH RELATIVE CONTRACT VALUE, EU26, 2009-2013 
Independent variable  
Percent single bidder 0.071 (0.000)  
Regional CRI  0.090 (0.000) 
 
N 
 
164,711 
 
164,711 
R2 0.088 0.086 
Comment: Each regression controls: sector of the contracting entity, type of contracting entity, year of contract award, country of 
contract award, main product market of procured goods and services, and contract value 
 
All in all, the validity checks strengthen our confidence that both our measures are indeed picking 
up high-level corruption risks. 
Career incentives in the public sector 
The primary independent variable captures the extent to which careers of public employees are 
independent of, in contrast to dependent on, connections. To measure this we surveyed 85,000 
respondents across the European regions in the European Quality of Government Survey (EQI) 
(Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein 2013). We first recorded whether respondents answered that 
they were employed in the public sector in order to include only individuals with direct experience 
of what they were being asked. Roughly 30 percent worked in the public sector in some capacity. 
We then used a ten-scale question asking what the respondent thinks is closest to her own view: “in 
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the public sector, most people can succeed if they are willing to work hard” (1) or “hard work is no 
guarantee of success in the public sector for most people – it’s more a matter of luck and connec-
tions” (10).3 
FIGURE 2, CAREER INCENTIVES FOR WORKING HARD IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR BY EUROPEAN 
REGION 
 
Note: Lighter shades indicate more independence of careers. 
Finally, we aggregate the scores by NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 region in each country, taking each re-
gion’s mean score and its standard error (the latter is used as weights in regression analysis). 
                                                     
3
 The survey was sent out in February of 2013 and was conducted in the local majority language in each country/region; 
the results were returned in April the same year. Respondents were surveyed via telephone interviews, each of approx-
imately ten minutes in length, with 32 questions, and the sample size in the survey was over 85,000. Moreover, the 
focus of the final data collected is the European Union’s so-called NUTS statistical regional level, and was therefore 
selectively sampled with more than 400 respondents per region.  
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Overall, we find that there is significant variation in how public sector employees view the road to 
success in their field, although respondents in the majority of European regions tend to lean to-
wards ‘luck and connections’ (as indicated by a score greater than ‘5’).  We reverse the scores (so 
that higher values equal more meritocracy – e.g. the opposite of the map) and find that the regional 
scores range from least meritocratic, 1.7 (Belgrade Region, Serbia), to most, 5.7 (South Midland, 
England).  Figure 4 shows the distribution by region in the sample (with the exception of Serbia 
and Ukraine). Regions that are shaded lighter are considered more meritocratic. For each region’s 
point estimate we produce a 95% confidence intervalto show statistical significance from one re-
gion’s estimate to another.4 
Estimation techniques  
Due to the spatial nature of the data, we use primarily ordinary and weighted least squares regres-
sion.5 However, as the data are cross-sectional, we run an obvious risk of endogenity between the 
two main variables. To deal with this issue, we employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental 
analysis in several models, using historical and cultural instruments for modern day career incen-
tives. 
While instruments are admittedly difficult to find, we explore two possibilities. First are the literacy 
rates in 1880, which we argue would be a determinant of bureaucratic career incentives today. Hol-
lyer (2011) argues that introducing civil service reforms that separated bureaucratic and political 
careers was only introduced when there was a pool of qualified candidates. A country or region 
with lower literacy rates is thus expected to be based more on patronage than regions with higher 
literacy rates, while a country or region with higher rates of literacy in the past had a wider pool 
from which to hire employees and thus, over time, stronger incentives for rulers to introduce meri-
tocracy. Theoretically, past literacy rates should not be directly correlated with corruption levels but 
through other direct channels (such as our hypothesis). Past literacy rates have been used in several 
previous empirical studies as an instrument for testing cultural or institutional development (Char-
ron and Lapuente 2013; Tabellini 2010).  
                                                     
4
 The standard error used to construct the confidence interval is used in several statistical models as a regional weight, 
weighting those regions with higher certainty higher in the estimations.  
5
 We experiment with several weights.  First, since our regions are of varying sizes, with some very large in population 
and (Catalonia, Bavaria, etc.) and some quite small (Bolzano, Azures) we weight each region by it relative population 
sample, giving more weight to regions with larger populations and thus more information.  Second, we re-run using the 
inverse of the standard error of the estimates of meritocracy by region. Third, we re-run models without weights.   
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Second, building on Weber (2002) and Becker and Woessmann (2009), who find that, historically, 
counties in Germany with higher concentrations of Protestantism have had better education and 
economic development, we use the proportion of Protestant residents in a region as an instrument 
for a more developed bureaucracy. In addition, Tabellini (2010) uses Protestantism in a sample of 
European regions as an instrument to explain beneficial aspects of modern day culture, which in 
turn lead to greater levels of economic development. 
In many cases, we have regional estimates for both literacy rates and Protestantism, where we could 
not find statistics at the regional level. However, we employ country averages.  Of course the validi-
ty of the instruments hinges on their statistical relationship with career incentives as well as their 
being uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of corruption.  We provide several tests of 
instrumental validity in these models. More detail on the two instrumental variables is given in Ap-
pendix 2.6   
Another issue of concern is our unit of analysis (regions in countries).  We ran a test of heteros-
kadasciticy (ivhettest in STATA) from bivariate corruption-career models. These show weak signs 
of heteroskadesticity due to country clustering (p=0.11) while, in later models with more control 
variables, the test shows stronger signs (p<0.01). This issue leads to a second potential violation of 
OLS—that our observations might not be independent due to the regions being nested in coun-
tries. This implies that the data are clustered (around countries) and that the slope estimates and, in 
particular, the standard errors can be biased due to issues of group-wise heteroskadasticity. There is 
ongoing debate on how to model this issue, where three possibilities can be considered 
(Wooldridge 2003): first, use clustered standard errors in normal or weighted regression; second, 
employ a fixed effects model, which isolates the variation of the variables within countries; third, 
use a random effects hierarchical model, which allows for random country intercepts. On the basis 
of this and the nature of our data, we elect to take the country context into account via clustered 
(country) standard errors and to run models with hierarchical estimation (regions nested in coun-
tries). We also re-run the primary models with country fixed effects in robustness checks. We fur-
ther provide both country and regional level variance in our tables, as recommended (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).  
 
                                                     
6
 Pairwise correlations between between our measure of corruption and the two instruments (past literacy rates and 
Protestantism) are relatively low – between -0.34 and -0.38.  We report several tests in all models to test for instrumen-
tal validity.   
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Alternative explanations 
Although the main purpose of this paper is to study implications of the suggestion made above, we 
also take into account explanations from comparative studies of control of corruption that are rea-
sonable at the regional level. 
First, we follow authors who regard economic development as a prerequisite for good government 
and low corruption. Different versions of this argument can be found in the work of Lipset (1960), 
Boix and Stokes (2003), or Welzel and Inglehart (2008). We control for the overall level of econom-
ic development and for the rates of growth in the last years in order to capture both the level and 
recent trends in regional economic development. For this, we take the purchasing power per capita 
for the most recent year (2012) and the year 2000 (the furthest year back that is available) from 
Eurostat. The growth rates are taken over this period. 
Second, we follow a large body of literature on trust and good government that has found how 
low-corruption countries (Zack and Knack 2001, Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) and low-corruption 
regions (Putnam 1993, Tabellini 2010) tend to have populations with high levels of social capital. 
We take the average degree of generalized trust into account from a recent study by Charron and 
Rothstein (2015).  The level of civic participation is captured via rates of electoral turnout for the 
latest regional level election (where applicable).   
Third, since the accumulation of political power has been noted as being important for understand-
ing corruption (Andrews and Montinola 2004), we control for four variables used in previous re-
gional studies of corruption (Charron and Lapuente 2013): i) the fractionalization of a region’s par-
liament for the latest year available (calculated as 1 minus the Herfindal Index for each region in the 
sample with a corresponding regional parliament), which is intended to capture the “clarity of re-
sponsibility” (Tavitis 2008); ii) the proportion of years a region has been governed by a single party; 
iii) whether the regional has a minority government; iv) how long the current party or coalition has 
been in power; and v) which, if one exists, is the electoral threshold that acts as an entry barrier for 
new political competitors at the regional level.7 
                                                     
7
 For such party and electoral institutional variables, as well as voter turnout, the number of regional observations falls to 
128, as only ’politically relevant’ regions (those with a corresponding elected chamber at the level sampled in our study) 
are included. 
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Fourth, certain religions appear in many studies to be associated with levels of corruption, where 
the expectation is that countries or regions will have higher corruption where a greater proportion 
of the population practices a hierarchic religion (La Porta et al. 1999). Since the sample focuses on 
European regions, we take the proportion of self-identified Catholics for each region, averaged 
from the latest two rounds of the European Social Survey. In addition, ethnic diversity is often 
pointed to as a hinder to clean government (Alesina et al. 2003), which is controlled for here with 
the percentage of non-EU born residents by region (Eurostat).    
Fifth, although the causal relationship is debated, countries with higher levels of income/wealth 
inequality tend on average to have higher corruption (You 2005). We use a Theil index of inequality 
of wages in six sectors of employment with the latest regional data (2010) from Galbraith and 
Garcilazo (2005) and the percentage of residents at risk for poverty by region in 2012 (Eurostat). 
Sixth, several studies have looked at gender inequalities and corruption levels and found strong 
correlations among these two factors (Wängnerud 2009), pointing out that greater levels of partici-
pation of women equate with lower levels of corruption (Swamy et al. 2001).  We control for the 
percentage of women in a region’s parliament taking data from Sundström (2013) 
Finally, we control for a geo-political factor—whether the region is the country’s capital—and de-
mographic factors—such as the region’s population and population density, taken from Eurostat. 
In some cases (data from ESS, women in parliament, Theil measure of wage inequality) the NUTS 
regions provided did not correspond to those in our data for all countries.  In all cases, the NUTS 
regions from other sources were lower (smaller regions); thus we aggregated from NUTS 2 to 
NUTS 1 or NUTS 3 to NUTS 2 using regional population weights taken from Eurostat. 
 
Results 
We begin by looking at the bivariate relationship between corruption and career incentives, which is 
relatively strong.8 The bivariate correlations with both our measures of the dependent variables are 
significantly correlated in the expected direction with career independence (p=<0.0000). We pro-
                                                     
8
 We check several bivariate regressions with different specification (OLS, WLS, 2SLS) and show scatterplots in Figure 
A1. 
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vide scatterplots in the appendix (Figure A1) that show that, on average, regions with more inde-
pendent career incentives are associated with lower corruption.  
When we include control variables, reported in Table 4, we show their effects one at a time and 
then finish with two full models (models 8 and 9). The “percent single bidder” is used in all models 
as the dependent variable, whereas our other measure (CRI) can be found together with a third 
measure for validity (bribery) in the appendix (Table A2). 
In model 1, we find a robust effect of independent bureaucratic careers on corruption, and indis-
tinguishable effects of population density and capital regions. In models 2 and 3, economic devel-
opment, broadly speaking, is accounted for with PPP per capita from 2011 (model 2) and from 
2000 (model 3).  The latter model also includes the total regional PPP growth per capita over this 
time period. Corroborating much earlier empirical literature, economic development—past and 
present—is strongly associated with lower corruption levels. Growth is positive, which is what we 
would expect (lesser developed regions tend to grow faster), yet the effect is negligible. 
Cultural variables are examined in models 4 and 5. First, we test the effects of religion and find that 
the percentage of self-identified Catholics in each region is positive but that its effect is insignifi-
cant. In model 5, both social trust and our measure of diversity (percent of non-EU born popula-
tion) show a significant relation with lower levels of corruption. 
Model 6 includes our measures of inequality, wage and gender. We find that the percentage of 
women in a sub-national parliament is significantly related to lower corruption. For example, the 
model predicts that a 10% increase in the women in parliament would result in a decrease in cor-
ruption of 0.1, ceteris paribus. 
Model 7 includes only politically relevant regions. We find that neither the fractionalization nor the 
voter turnout is associated with higher or lower corruption on average. The negative effect of high-
er levels of career independence on corruption remains strongly robust in all the models. 
Model 8 is the full model (without past PPP or growth, which were insignificant).  We find that, 
although several variables, such as PPP per capita, fall below statistical significance, career inde-
pendence remains strongly robust to the inclusion of all variables. Model 9 includes only politically 
relevant regions, together with significant factors from model 8, plus PPP per capita in 2011. In all 
cases, career independence in the public sector is a significant predictor of corruption levels.  Inter-
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estingly, the percentage of women in parliament is strongly robust in all models in which it is in-
cluded, corroborating several past studies (Swamy et al. 2001). 
As several of the explanatory variables correlate between 0.4 and 0.5 with our career measure (in 
particular, PPP per capita and social trust), we include the variance inflation factor (VIF) for every 
model to show the extent to which multicollinearity might have an impact on the efficiency of the 
estimates. In none of the cases do we observe a serious problem. We find the effects to be uniform, 
irrespective of the measure of corruption used (see Table A2 in the appendix for results for the 
CRI and bribery measures). Finally, for robustness, all models in Table 4 are re-run using MLM 
estimation, and the full model is re-run removing all outlier regions.9  No significant differences are 
observed in the results.10   
                                                     
9
 We define outliers as those regions having greater than 4/n on the Cook’s D statistic (a formula taking into account leverage and resid-
uals of each observation).  Using this rule of thumb, we identify seven outlying regions and re-run the models without them.  The regions 
are: GR2,  IE02, ITE2, PL62, RO11, RO32 and SK01. 
10
 Visuals of the residual plots and plots of residuals versus actual values of the full model 8, as well as outliers, are given in the appen-
dix.   
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TABLE 4, THE EFFECT OF CAREER INDEPENDENCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR ON CORRUPTION 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Careers -0.09** -0.07** -0.06** -0.07** 0.05** -0.09** -0.06** -0.05** -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Pop. density (log) -0.002       0.004  
 (0.01)       (0.05)  
Capital region -0.03       0.03  
 (0.03)       (0.04)  
PPP 2011 (log)  -0.10**      -0.03 -0.06 
  (0.03)      (0.05) (0.05) 
PPP 2000 (log)   -0.09**       
   (0.03)       
PPP growth (2000-2011)   0.0001       
   (0.006)       
Percent Catholic    0.11    0.10  
    (0.07)    (0.06)  
Percent non-EU born     -0.01**   -0.001  
     (0.002)   (0.002)  
Social trust     -0.21   -0.20* -0.11 
     (0.13)   (0.08) (0.11) 
Wage ineq. (Theil)      -0.96  0.13  
      (1.51)  (0.93)  
Percent women parliament      -0.01**  -0.005** -0.003* 
      (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Party fractionalization       0.30*  0.21 
       (0.14)  (0.14) 
Voter turnout       -0.002  -0.001 
       (0.002)  (0.02) 
Constant 0.56** 1.53** 1.53** 0.44** 0.54** 0.75** 0.48** 0.86* 1-01 
 (0.12) (0.31) -0.24 (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) -0.15 (0.36) (0.55) 
No observations 186 186 186 181 182 182 127 176 122 
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Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 20 10 
R² 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.42 0.45 0.36 0.59 0.44 
Mean VIF 1.06 1.12 1.86 1.15 1.25 1.11 1.07 1.92 1.85 
Comment: The dependent variable is percent of single bidders. WLS estimation with robust cluster (country), standard errors in 
parentheses. Observations are weighted by population. VIF is the mean variance inflation factor, which displays the extent to 
which multicollinearity might affect the efficiency of a given model.  Models 7 and 9 are run with ‘politically relevant’ regions only, 
hence the drop in observations.  **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
For a more concrete interpretation, we look at Table 5, which elucidates the marginal effects of 
career independence on corruption. We highlight predicted levels of corruption at the minimum 
value, 25th percentile, mean and 75th percentile and max levels of career independence, along with 
standard errors and confidence intervals. The model indicates that the lowest levels of corruption 
differ significantly from mean values and above, while the highest values are significantly distin-
guishable from just under the 75th percentile and below.  We find that a min-max change in career 
independence is associated with almost three times fewer single-bid procurement contracts in a 
region (0.25 to 0.09). It is possible to turn these results into savings for governments using regres-
sion results shown in Table 3. Three standard deviation increases in career independence (about a 2 
point increase) implies a 0.6-1.3% price decrease across Europe: that is a 14-31 billion EUR savings 
per year for the whole of EU in 2010 prices.11 
TABLE 5, MARGINAL EFFECT OF CAREERS ON CORRUPTION – FROM FULL MODEL WITH CON-
TROLS 
Careers Predicted corruption Standard error 95% c.i. 
Min 0.25 0.03 0.19 0.30 
25
th
 percentile 0.19 0.015 0.16 0.22 
Mean 0.16 0.01 0.14 0.18 
75
th
 percentile 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.16 
Max 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.12 
Comment: marginal effects calculations from post-estimation command margins in STATA. Estimates from model 8 (full 
model) are given in Table 4.    
 
                                                     
11
 For the minimum estimate, we used model 1 in Table 7: 0.04*2.04*0.071. For the maximum estimate, we used model 1 in Table 4: 
0.09*2.04*0.071.  
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To address the potential issues of endogenity, Table 6 reports models using a 2SLS specification. 
The first three models in Table 6 are simple WLS regressions with country clustered standard errors 
and no controls and highlight the relationship between the instrumental variables—past literacy 
rates and proportion of Protestantism—with career independence in the public sector. Both are in 
the expected direction; they are significant at the 99% level of confidence and remain significant 
when included together in model 3.  
Models 4-6 try to isolate the exogenous effects of career independence on corruption with the use 
of a 2SLS IV regression for both our measure of corruption and for the measure on bribery. These 
models also include control variables (not shown).  We find that the effects of career independence 
on both procurement and bribery are remarkably robust to this estimation. Thus we alleviate any 
concerns that career incentives are endogenous to corruption, that both proxy for a salient omitted 
variable, and even that our indicators are measured with a sufficiently damaging level of error. 
TABLE 6, IV REGRESSION ESTIMATES (2SLS) FOR THREE MEASURES OF CORRUPTION 
  DV=Careers                     DV=Corruption 
  1 2 3 Single bids CRI Bribery 
Careers    -0.12** -0.04* -0.10** 
     (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Past literacy 0.01**  0.06*    
  (0.004)  (0.03)    
Protestantism  2.92** 2.27**    
   (0.62) (0.60)    
Constant  3.80** 4.23** 3.95**    
  (0.22) (0.12) (0.20)    
No. obs  179 185 179 175 175 177 
Countries        
R² 0.24 0.34 0.38 0.47 0.50 0.33 
Uncentered R²    0.80 0.97 0.62 
1st stage F test    16.6** 16.6** 17.07** 
Kleibergen-Paap (χ²)    14.5** 14.6** 14.9** 
Hanson J test (χ²)    0.003 1.81 5.05* 
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Comment: Models 1-3 OLS with country clustered standard errors (in parentheses).  The depend-
ent variable is careers. Models 4-6 use the three measures of corruption as the dependent variable 
and include population density (log), PPP per capita (2011, log), social trust, % of women in par-
liament, and robust standard errors in parentheses. In models 4-6, careers are modeled as the en-
dogenous regressor with literacy and Protestantism as exogenous instruments.  Regions weighted 
by population.  Relevance of the instruments with careers is tested with the first stage F-test (Ho: 
instruments are weakly identified).  The Kleibergen-Paap (Chi2) test tests whether the equation is 
properly identified (Ho: model is underidentified).  The Hanson J statistic tests whether the instru-
ments are valid, e.g. uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage (Ho: instruments are val-
id). 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
This is based on valid instruments.  For an instrument to be valid, it must be correlated with the 
endogenous variable (careers), nevertheless not with the error term in the second stage estimations 
for corruption when the other regressors are controlled for in the model.  The first stage F test in 
models 4-6 shows that the instruments are strongly relevant (the rule of thumb is an F statistic 
>10).  The Kleibergen-Paap test shows that our model is not under-identified, while the Hanson’ J 
statistic’, which tests the correlation between the instruments and the second stage error term, 
shows that the instruments are quite valid in the first two cases.  In the third case (bribery), we find 
that the instruments are somewhat correlated (p=0.04) with the residuals in the second stage, mean-
ing that the estimates of model 6 (bribery) should be interpreted with more caution.  
Thus far, we have accounted for several factors associated with corruption on a regional level, but 
some factors from the literature are difficult to disaggregate from the country level with existing 
data. For example, Brunetti and Weder (2003) point to the level of press freedom being negatively 
associated with corruption, while Keefer (2007) highlights the effects of the age of a country’s 
democratic institutions as affecting the level of corruption, and much debate has centered around 
the effects of ethnic diversity and corruption (Alesina et al. 2003).  In the next table we therefore 
ask whether our results hold when we account for country factors. Table 7 checks for further ro-
bustness and focuses on the factors that were not accounted for in the regional level analysis—age 
of democracy, freedom of the press and ethnic heterogeneity are also checked in the table below, 
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which uses both MLM and WLS (with country clustered, robust standard errors) to estimate the 
effects of the variables on the two levels.12   
All models include controls from Table 7 at the regional level, and each country level factor is taken 
one at a time, building up to the full model in models 7 and 8. In sum, corroborating several previ-
ous studies, regions in countries with a longer history of democracy and higher levels of press free-
dom tend on average to have lower corruption, while states that are more ethnically diverse tend to 
have regions with higher levels of corruption. In none of these models that account for country 
level effects does the impact of career independence on corruption fall from significance, demon-
strating strong and robust evidence for our hypothesis. Interestingly, the random components of 
the MLM models show that the standard deviation at the country level is near ‘0’ in the models, 
while the standard deviation of regions at the second level is in large part insignificant.  There is 
also little residual variance of the dependent variable at the country level relative to the regional 
level, in particular when the three country level factors are included, again highlighting the relevance 
of the regional level of analysis, which supports using the region as the primary unit of analysis. 
Finally, we find the results robust to our other measure of corruption (see Table A2, models 3 and 
6 in Appendix 1). 
 
TABLE 7, THE EFFECT OF CAREER INDEPENDENCE ON CORRUPTION ACCOUNTING FOR COUN-
TRY LEVEL FACTORS 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Careers -0.04** -0.04** -0.06** -0.06** -0.04** -0.04** -0.02* -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.006) (0.007) 
Country level variables         
Years of democracy -0.002** -0.002**     -0.002* -0.002 
 (0.0005) (0.001)     (0.001) (0.001) 
Ethnic fractionalization   0.003** 0.003**   0.006** 0.006** 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Press freedom     0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 0.005* 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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 Country level data taken from the Quality of Government Institute’s homepage, (Teorell et al. 2013).   
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Constant 0.45 0.45 0.89* 0.88* 0.31 0.31 -0.04 -0.004 
 (0.29) (0.26) (0.33) (0.34) (0.47) (0.49) (0.33) (0.34) 
Random Variance Components         
Sd (cons) 
1.04e-11 
(6.41e-10)  
3.04e-12( 
1.48e-10)  
2.54e-14 
(1.77e-12 )  
3.65e-
12(2.42e-10)    
Sd (residual) 0.08 (0.045)  0.08(0.05)  0.07 (0.04)  0.07 (0.04)  
Obs 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
R²  0.58  0.54  0.61  0.66 
Wald model test Pr(χ²) 269.4  1027.9   170.2  1267.6  
Log likelihood (iteration 0) 0.889  0.889   0.923  0.982  
Log likelihood 1.102  1.056  1.137  1.196  
Estimation method MLM WLS MLM WLS MLM WLS MLM WLS 
Comment: The dependent variable is percent of single bidders.  All models include (not shown): PPP per capita (logged, 
2011), social trust, population density (logged) and % women in parliament.  Other regional level variables from Table XX 
were dropped due to insignificance.  WLS (weighted least squares) estimation reports country clustered, robust standard errors in 
parentheses; in such models the regional level observations are weighted by the population.  MLM is estimated with the same 
regional controls as the WLS models and allows for random country intercepts. Units weighted by population and country-
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Conclusions 
Institutional quality matters. But the way in which institutional quality can be achieved is subject to 
debate among scholars and practitioners. It was long argued that institutional capacity was the re-
sult of an appropriate investment of resources, but economists have shown that this might not be 
the solution after all and that, quite the opposite, cheap money can foster irresponsible political 
behavior similar to that experimented in oil booms (Fernandez-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos 
2013; Tabellini 2010).  
Consequently, attention has shifted towards incentives, in particular towards the incentives provid-
ed by institutions regulating the relationship between citizens and politicians. The idea underlying 
scholarly works emphasizing the importance of democracy for the long-term prosperity of nations 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), reformers´ proposals of open-list electoral systems and party pri-
maries in corruption-ridden countries (Financial Times 2013) and recent massive anti-corruption 
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rallies in Athens, Madrid and Rome that demand a real democracy, is that improving the accountability 
of the representatives to the represented will minimize corruption. Let’s make the agents as ac-
countable as possible to their principals! 
Such suggestions overlook the crucial role of the bureaucracy. To the extent we trust the results 
presented in this paper, the aim should not be to make agents (bureaucrats) as responsive as possi-
ble to their principals (politicians) but, quite the contrary, make them independent of each other. 
The empirical analyses have indeed shown that, controlling for the usual confounders in the litera-
ture, making bureaucrats less reliant on political connections reduces the risks of corruption. Con-
versely, where bureaucrats’ career incentives exclusively follow professional criteria, we find the 
lowest levels of corruption risk.  
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Appendix 1 
TABLE A1, FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND SOURCES 
Variable  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Source  
Regional level         
Proportion single bids 186 0.24 0.14 0.01 0.73 Fazekas et al (2013) 
CRI 185 0.27 0.07 0.12 0.50 Fazekas et al (2013) 
Bribery (proportion) 189 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.43 Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente (2014) 
Careers 189 4.48 0.68 2.75 6.00 Author created 
pop. Density (log) 189 2.50 -1.65 0.02 8.49 Eurostat  
Captial region 189 0.11 0.32 0 1 Eurostat  
PPPp.c. (2011, log) 189 10.00 0.39 8.88 10.93 Eurostat  
PPPp.c. (2000, log) 189 9.68 0.51 8.13 10.79 Eurostat  
PPP growth (2000-2011) 189 40.12 32.27 5.45 181.65 Eurostat  
Wage Inequality (2010) 187 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 Galbraith and Garcilazo (2005) 
Poverty Risk (2008) 181 16.17 6.71 4.90 38.40 Eurostat  
% women parl 182 27.60 8.19 10.00 44.97 
Sundström (2013) 
Social Trust 189 0.43 0.18 0.09 0.81 Charron and Rothstein (2015) 
Party Fractionalization 128 0.67 0.12 0.37 0.86 
Author calculated, raw data from: www.parties-
and-elections.eu  
Reg. Voter turnout 128 58.66 13.43 29.45 92.90 
Author created, raw data from: www.parties-
and-elections.eu 
Protestant 185 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.70 
Author created, raw data from 2010 & 2012 
ESS data (Appendix 2) 
Catholic 185 0.39 0.32 0.00 0.98 
Author created, raw data from 2010 & 2012 
ESS data 
% non EU-born 183 5.64 5.40 0.00 30.06 Eurostat  
Literacy rates (1880) 183 55.4 25.2 8.88 97.5 
Author collected from various sources (Appen-
dix 2) 
        
Country level        
Consec. Yrs dem 189 48.94 18.30 16.00 63.00 Polity IV  
Ethnic fractionliazation 189 0.73 3.70 0.05 25.81 Alesina et al (2003) 
Press freedom (2013) 189 23.61 8.64 10 42 Freedom House 
Gini index 185 32.12 3.57 24.70 38.45 World Development Indicators 
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TABLE A2, ESTIMATIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CORRUPTION: REGIONAL AND 
COUNTRY LEVEL VARIABLES FOR FULL SAMPLE AND POLITICALLY RELEVANT REGIONS (FULL 
MODELS ONLY) 
Variable CRI CRI CRI Bribery Bribery Bribery 
Careers -0.02** -0.03*** -0.012* -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.015* 
 (0.009) (0.01) (0.062) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
Pop. density (log) -0.002 0.06** -0.005* 0.003 0.01 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.02) (0.003) (0.004) (0.04) (0.004) 
Capital region -0.009 -0.03  0.05* 0.01  
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02)  
PPP 2000 (log) -0.003 0.02 0.015 -0.05* 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.011) (0.026) (0.03) (0.02) 
PPP growth (2000-2011)       
       
% Catholic 0.01   0.001   
 (0.02)   (0.04)   
% non-EU born 0.001   0.001   
 (0.001)   (0.001)   
Social trust -0.09** -0.06** -0.07* -0.03 -0.13** -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Wage ineq. (Theil) 0.06   1.67*   
 (0.78)   (0.63)   
% women parliament -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005** -0.004** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.02) (0.01) 
Party fractionalization   0.11   0.12  
  (0.07)   (0.15)  
Voter turnout  0.0001   0.0003  
  (0.0005)   (0.001)  
Yrs. consec. Democracy   -0.0003   0.001 
   (0.0005)   (0.001) 
Ethnic fractionalization    0.001   0.001 
   (0.001)   (0.0007) 
Press freedom   0.002**   0.006*** 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Constant 0.57** 0.14 0.30*** 0.83** 0.006 0.18 
 (0.13) (0.26) (0.09) (0.24) (0.33) (0.16) 
Random Variance Components      
Sd(cons)   0.0009(0.006)   0.00005(0.0002) 
Sd (residual)   0.042 (0.024)   0.038(0.023) 
Wald Chi2   319.6   958.7 
Obs 176 122 180 178 123 180 
Countries 20 10 20 20 10 20 
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R²  0.54 0.48  0.61 0.50  
Mean VIF 1.92 2.35  1.92 2.34  
Estimation WLS WLS MLM WLS WLS MLM 
Comment: WLS (weighted least squares) with robust country clustered standard errors (in parentheses). MLM is multilevel 
estimation with robust clustered standard errors (in parentheses).  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
FIGURE A1, BIVARIATE SCATTERPLOTS OF THE THREE CORRUPTION VARIABLES WITH THE 
CAREER VARIABLE (ENTIRE SAMPLE AND WITHIN COUNTRIES BY CORRUPTION VARIABLE) 
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Appendix 2: Further details on the instrumental variables 
 
I. Protestantism 
We collected data from the European Social Survey using the question “Which Religion or denom-
ination (do you) belong to at present?” We coded all respondents who answered affirmative to 
‘Protestant’ as ‘1’ and any other religious denomination, lack of denomination or ‘refusal’ as ‘0’.  
The ‘don’t know/refusal’ rate was less than 0.4% in all samples used.   We then aggregated the 
individual level responses to the closest available regional NUTS code that the ESS provides for 
each country, and individual units were weighted using the recommended design weights provided 
by the ESS to ensure better representativeness.  In some cases, our NUTS level did not match that 
of the ESS (they provided NUTS 2, while we have NUTS 1); we then aggregated the NUTS 2 level 
data to NUTS 1, weighting by regional population.  As not all countries and regions are included in 
every round of the ESS, we take the average score of the last two rounds in order to include all 
regions in our sample.   
II. Average literacy rates in 1880 (approximate) 
Our data sources are heterogeneous and are thus subject to some measurement error.  However, 
we use this measure not as an ‘exact’ level of literacy but as a proxy for the approximate level of 
historical human capital and inequalities in development near the turn of the 20th century.   
Argument: literacy and education offered the opportunity of a civil service post and the added pres-
tige of a close association with public authority.  A country/region with lower literacy rates was 
more ‘elitist’ and was thus expected to be based more on patronage than regions with higher rates. 
 
i. Countries with regional level sources 
 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, West Germany, U.K., Belgium,  
 
Literacy rates by region, 1880, from Tabellini (2010) 
 
For UK’s missing regions, the region of London is taken from (Blaug 1975), while Northern Ire-
land is taken from Flora, 1987. 
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East German (Prussian) regions  
 
Estimates for 1880 used from linear predictions from 1870 and 1900 data from Flora (1973)   
 
Austria and Czech Republic 
 
Good (2002) provides a measure of regional inequality of Austro-Hungarian regions (Alpine, Bo-
hemian, Southern and Carpathian). Used together with an exact estimate of Galician (Carpathian) 
regions in Poland from Corrsin (1988), we calculate the regions in current day Czech and Austrian 
regions (minus Burgenland).  Estimates for capital regions (Prague and Vienna) are taken from  
 
Regions of Hungary, Slovakia, Romania (3), Croatia (1), Burgenland (AT) in the Hungari-
an part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
Rates of 1880, aggregated from county level data to today’s regions (from Toth 1996) 
Poland 
Regions in Poland in 1880 were divided into three different empires (Austria Hungary – Galacia 
and Silesia provinces -, Prussia and Russia), and the regional differences in literacy rates were note-
worthy.  We take rates for the five Russian regions of Lodzkie, Lubuskie, Mazowieckie, Podlaskie, 
Swietokrzyskie from Janos (2000), while the regions in Galacia (Malopolskie and Podkarpackie) are 
taken from Corrsin (1988).  Prussian regions (Lubelskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Opolskie, 
Warminsko-Mazurskie and Pomorskie) were taken from Flora (1973) and calculated for 1880 using 
linear extrapolation from 1870 and 1900 data.  The remaining four regions were divided between 
two or more empires in 1880 – Russia and Prussia (Wielkopolskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie) Prus-
sia and Austrian-Silesia (Dolnoslaskie) and Prussia, Russia and Galacia (Slaskie). Due to a lack of 
county population data in 1880, we take simple averages for the divided Russian, Prussian, Galacian 
and Silesian (based on Bohemia/Morovia rates) regions. 
Romania  
We take the three regions in the Hungarian empire (Nord-Vest, Centru and Vest) from Toth 
(1996); the other five regions come from Janos (2000). 
ii. Countries for which regions derive from national level estimates 
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Greece  
Averaged male and female country rates (1870) come from Roudometof (2000). 
 
Bulgaria 
Due to conflicting estimates from two sources, we take average rates from two sources (Janos 2000, 
and Roudometof, 2000). 
 
Averaged male and female rates (1881) are from Roudometof, (2000) and total rates from Janos 
(2000). 
 
Sweden, Denmark (Copenhagen region specified) and Finland 
Rates at 1880.  For Finland, rates of Protestants only (church census) come from Markussen (1990). 
Ireland 
From Flora (1987) 
 
Sources:  
Flora, 1987.  State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975: A data handbook in two 
volumes. 
Flora, P. (1973). Historical Processes of Social Mobilization: Urbanization andLliteracy, 1850–1965. 
Building States and Nations: Models and Data Resources, 1, 213-258. 
Markussen, I. (1990). The development of writing ability in the Nordic countries in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Scandinavian Journal of History, 15(1-2), 37-63. 
Janos, Andrew.  2000.  East Central Europe in the Modern World. (p 140) 
Roudometof, V. (2000). The social origins of Balkan politics: nationalism, underdevelopment, and 
the nation-state in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880-1920. Mediterranean Quarterly, 11(3), 144-163. 
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Toth, Istvan György. 1996. Literacy and Written Culture in Early Modern Central Europe. Budapest: CEU 
Press. 
Good, D. F. (2002). Austria-Hungary. Patterns of European Industrialisation: The Nineteenth Cen-
tury, 218. 
 
Corrsin, Stephen D. Literacy rates and questions of language, faith and ethnic identity in population 
censuses in the partitioned Polish lands and interwar Poland (1880–1930s). The Polish Review 43, 
no. 2 (1998): 131-60. 
 
Mark Blaug, The Economics of Education in English Classical Political Economy: A Re-
Examination, in A. Skinner and T. Wilson, eds., Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975), p. 595. 
 
 
